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Abstract  
Pastoral conflicts have struck Ethiopia in different forms for centuries, and are thus 
not a new phenomenon. However, during the past two decades the country has 
experienced an increase in the frequency and intensity of violent inter-ethnic 
conflicts. This study sets out to investigate the socio-political causes and dynamics of 
contemporary pastoral inter-ethnic conflicts; putting emphasis on the role that the 
installment of ethnic federalism plays in these. The focal point is Ethiopia’s peripheral 
lowlands, home to the majority of the country’s pastoral and agro-pastoral 
communities, and the scene of rampant local conflicts. The study relies on a 
comprehensive review of theoretical literature and publications on the case of 
Ethiopia. Taking a political ecology approach, balancing emphasis towards socio-
political aspects in the interpretations of contemporary dynamics of pastoral conflicts, 
it is argued that in the case of Ethiopia, processes of state-building and pastoral 
conflicts are closely interlinked. The study finds that the political order of ethnic 
federalism has fueled and reconfigured pastoral conflicts, transforming pastoralists’ 
relationship to their territory, customary institutions, the government, and other 
competing pastoral groups. The political orientation towards ethnicity has made space 
for ethnic entrepreneurs, and consequently hardened ethnic and territorial boundaries, 
and redefined conflicts along ethnic lines rather than simple resource needs. 
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1. Introduction 
 “What is the cause of such bloodshed? Is it an ‘ethnic' conflict? a 'resource 
conflict'? a 'conflict of identities' of 'cultures' of 'values'? It is all these and 
much more.” (Markakis 2003:446) 
Pastoral conflicts have struck Ethiopia in different forms for centuries, and are thus 
not a new phenomenon. However, during the past two decades the country has 
experienced an increase in the frequency and intensity of violent inter-ethnic 
conflicts, resulting in far more casualties and derived humanitarian crisis (Markakis 
2003; Abdulahi 2005; Unruh 2005; Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008).  
The causes and dynamics of conflicts in Ethiopia are changing due to a number of 
factors, including environmental degradation, shrinking grazing lands, climate change 
and political instability (Meier et al. 2007; Abdulahi 2005; Hagmann and Mulugeta 
2008). However, although inter-ethnic conflicts were apparent prior to 1991, such 
conflicts became more evident after the then newly incumbent EPRDF government 
introduced a new policy of ethnic federalism, reconfiguring the state structure into a 
federation based on ethno-linguistic differences (Debelo 2012; Milas and Latif 2000; 
Tache and Oba 2009; Abbink 2006).  
This study investigates the socio-political causes and dynamics of pastoral inter-
ethnic conflicts, putting emphasis on the role that ethnic federalism plays in these. 
The focal point is Ethiopia’s peripheral lowlands, home to the majority of the 
country’s pastoral and agro-pastoral communities, and the scene of rampant local 
conflicts. The presence and frequency of conflicts have for long reinforced 
primodialist interpretations of pastoral conflict and the perception of pastoralism as a 
static and backward mode of production (Goldsmith 2013). Arguing that we need to 
move on from such interpretations of pastoral conflict, we instead propose a 
viewpoint accounting for the complex power relations at play in these situations. We 
wish to unfold how the decentralization policy and related land policies pursued by 
the Ethiopian state, plays out at the local level. We take a political ecology approach, 
balancing emphasis towards socio-political aspects in the interpretations of 
contemporary dynamics of pastoral conflicts, as we adopt the standpoint of authors, 
who stress the importance of institutional arrangements, changing policies and politics 
in generating resource conflicts (e.g. Bogale and Korf 2007; Tache and Oba 2009; 
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Peluso and Watts 2001). We address pastoral conflicts as a highly politicized matter 
and, inspired by Hagmann and Mulugeta (2008), we argue that in the case of Ethiopia, 
processes of state-building and pastoral conflicts are closely interlinked. 
Our overall argument is that the political order of ethnic federalism has fueled and 
reconfigured pastoral conflicts, transforming pastoralists’ relationship to their 
territory, customary institutions, the government, and other competing pastoral 
groups. The political orientation towards ethnicity has consequently hardened ethnic 
and territorial boundaries, and conflicts have been redefined along ethnic lines rather 
than resource needs. This argument is supported by five main findings; 1) The ethnic-
based federal system links territorial control to political and economic power. 
Contemporary conflicts in pastoral regions hence come to include competition over a 
broad range of political, social and economic resources, beyond pasture and wells. 2) 
Constitutional co-optation of customary institutions into the state sphere, and the 
resulting ‘commercialization’ of peace making, has undermined their legitimacy. 3) 
Violence has become a dominant approach to exclude others from pastoral resources 
due to the de facto open access. 4) Open access and politicization of ethnicity have 
fostered ethnic entrepreneurs, who strategically use ethnicity for personal interest. All 
disagreements are seen through a screen of ‘ethnic’ interest and ambitions, which 
imply that conflicts that initially had nothing to do with ethnicity are turned into 
‘ethnic conflicts’. 5) The intrusive and illegitimate federal central power and the weak 
democratic foundation fuel ‘ethnic’ conflicts on the local level, which due to the 
political orientation towards ethnicity have become localized, decentralized and non-
state directed. 
2. Methodology and Objectives  
2.2. Approach 
The report investigates how the post-1991 political order of ethnic federalism has 
affected local-level, inter-ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia’s pastoral lowlands. The study is 
done through a comprehensive review of the large body of literature on the issues of 
property rights, access, claim making, and pastoral conflict paradigms in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. This is held together with publications on pastoralism, conflicts, politics and 
property in the Ethiopian lowlands. Through a political ecology approach and the 
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adoption of a conceptual framework emphasizing the importance of power relations 
and agency among actors, the paper unfolds how contemporary conflicts have been 
reconfigured by the state, transforming pastoralist life-worlds, politics, and resource 
management.  
Through the lens of a political ecology perspective, pastoral conflicts (violent or 
nonviolent) are associated with both struggles to gain access to natural resources, and 
struggles resulting from the use of natural resources. In this paper we, however, 
balance emphasis towards socio-political elements of pastoral conflicts, rather than 
ecological influences. We adopt the same standpoint as authors who stress the 
importance of institutional arrangements, changing policies and politics ultimately 
generating resource conflicts (e.g. Bogale and Korf 2007; Tache and Oba 2009; 
Peluso and Watts 2001). In doing so, we do not disregard the relevance of physical 
resource scarcity caused by population pressure and climate change, but we underline 
that distributional scarcity plays an even greater role in this specific case. We address 
pastoral conflicts as highly politicized matters, and emphasize that processes of state-
building and pastoral conflicts are closely interlinked in the case of Ethiopia. In the 
following, we outline the conceptual framework, which we make use of in the 
analysis of pastoral conflicts in the Ethiopian lowlands. 
To facilitate an analysis of the interrelations between state-building and pastoral 
conflicts in the lowlands of Ethiopia we, as stated above, take a political ecology 
approach. This enables us to unfold significant social, political and economic 
processes in Ethiopia, which have influenced resource distribution and power 
dynamics - especially in terms of the pastoral population. Ascribing ourselves to 
Henrik Vigh’s understanding of social navigation (Vigh 2009), we seek ontologically 
to pay attention to both agency and structures, as social agents and social 
environments interact. Our underlying opinion is thus that individuals and groups 
always have to navigate in a constantly moving social and political environment. We 
apply the term ethnic entrepreneurs to investigate the actors, who seek to take 
advantage of the window of opportunity caused by the instatement of ethnic 
federalism. When analyzing the competition and acts of dominance in the struggle for 
resources and power in the pastoral lowlands, we make use of both Ribot and Peluso’s 
(2003) access framework, and Poteete and Ribot’s (2011) redefined version of the 
framework as Repertories of Domination. Through this lens, possession of powers, 
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i.e. repertoires of domination, determine who has the ability to access and control 
pastoral resources. Inspired by Christian Lund’s (2008) perception of resource 
struggles as a ‘game’ taking place in a arena or a theater, we seek to investigate how 
ethnic positioning, strategic navigation, individual claims disguised as collective, 
ethnic grievances and other acts of dominance are applied by various actors in 
attempts to gain, maintain and control access over pastoral resources. Ultimately, this 
analytical toolbox enables us to discuss the link between ethnic federalism and 
pastoral conflicts. 
Throughout large parts of the paper, examples from a number of cases are given in 
order for us to better conceptualize what is happening on the ground. These examples 
all come from publications on Ethiopian resource conflicts. They have been selected 
based on the criteria that the conflicts have to be situated in the lowlands, and 
represent struggles between pastoral or agro-pastoral groups. Also, these conflicts all 
have long historical roots and can thus be interpreted through time. It is important to 
note that these are only a few of an otherwise long list of cases of conflict between 
groups (for a more comprehensive list, see e.g. Abbink 2006). 
2.2. Outline 
This, chapter two of the paper, outlines the approach and choice of theoretical 
concepts that lie as the foundation for the following results.  It underlines why this 
approach is an essential tool in the efforts for understanding contemporary conflicts in 
Ethiopia. In brief, it explains the conceptual framework that the paper is based on, 
highlighting important notions and concepts used throughout the text. The aim is to 
put together an analytical ‘toolbox,’ which serves to stress valuable points in the 
unfolding of the complex relationship between territories, federal and regional 
state(s), institutions, groups, and policies.  
In chapter three the relevant theoretical literature is discussed in detail. This is done 
in an attempt to highlight important debates and provide knowledge on different 
schools of thought. This enhances the ability to understand and critically examine the 
policy of ethnic federalism, and its effects on inter-ethnic conflicts. Therefore, going 
through different streams of thought, this chapter specifies the nature of property 
rights, the processes through which actors gain access to and derive benefits from 
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resources, and whether these land resources can and should be seen as sources of 
inter-ethnic conflicts.  
Chapter four unfolds the Ethiopian case. This includes a closer look at pastoral 
livelihoods in the Ethiopian lowlands, and historical relations between the central 
state and its lowland periphery. It takes a closer look at the policy of ethnic 
federalism, before turning to perspectives of the Ethiopian land tenure systems. 
Especially the historical perspective in this chapter is important, as we stress the need 
to understand historic processes of power and unequal resource distribution to 
understand the present. The aim is thus to underline the historical connotations that 
the contemporary reality relies on.  
Chapter five seeks to link theoretical concepts to empirical cases. The aim is to bring 
forward and utilize the concepts found in the literature and actively uses these to gain 
a better understanding of what has been observed on the ground. Using examples 
from a number of historical and ongoing conflicts, emphasis is put on the ambiguous 
role that the federal state takes in its dealings with these, shifting support, and creating 
power asymmetry. In the end, we argue that the current political order represents a 
moving environment, granting opportunities and challenges for local actors. 
Chapter six incorporates empirical cases to facilitate a deeper look into the role of 
customary institutions and authorities. The role of the state is still a key feature, as the 
state mediates communal tenure and is active in reconfiguring the relationship 
between the state and customary authorities. The chapter thus shows how state 
recognition and co-optation of customary institutions are altering inter- and intra 
group relations, affecting resource sharing arrangements and altering lifestyles. It is 
argued that the creation of de facto open access tenure regimes renders violent 
confrontation a powerful means of securing access in resource claim-making.  
Chapter seven starts by challenging the notion of “pastoral” conflicts, as the 
emergence of new sources of revenue are now equally important in the competition 
between opposing groups. The chapter then moves to deal with the role of ethnic 
entrepreneurs, who are at the forefront of (re)articulating and (re)defining ethnic 
identities in order for them to gain, maintain or control access to valuable resources. 
The theory of repertoires of domination (Poteete and Ribot 2011) is given a main role 
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in describing the strategic positioning of these actors, while examples are used to 
demonstrate how this materializes in reality.  
Chapter eight summarizes the main conclusions from the analysis, and then seeks to 
discuss the implications of our approach. Furthermore, we broaden the scope of our 
findings by discussing the Ethiopian case in relation to a broader African context, 
bringing in cases from e.g. the Sahel, and surrounding countries of the Horn and East 
Africa. Lastly, we discuss the implications of an ethnic-based federal system, 
comparing its implementation in Ethiopia and India. 
Chapter nine is the concluding chapter and where the main findings are presented. It 
shortly summarizes the paper, the main discussions and results, and sheds new light 
on how we are to look at and understand contemporary ‘resource’ conflicts. 
3. Literature review 
3.1. Conceptualization of property and land tenure in Africa 
Throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, questions of access to and control over land as a 
property are some of the most prominent and contested debates of local politics (Juul 
and Lund 2002). Scholars and academic researchers have produced a large body of 
literature on the issues of ownership, property rights, and access to specific resources 
such as land, water and minerals. Generally, this body of literature makes assessments 
of land policies and reforms in terms of tenure security (Okoth-Ogendo 2006; Berry 
1993), productivity, investment, economic growth (De Soto 2001), social 
differentiation (Peters 2004), and transformation of traditional and social fabric (Lund 
2008). The core of the debates is what role African states are to play in governing the 
land question, and whether state interventions increase inequality or promote equality 
and justice.  
For decades, Western development aid, mainly led by the World Bank, has been 
facilitating state policies on privatization, individualization and land markets on the 
African continent. In the 1990’s, this form of aid started to receive growing critique 
from resource scholars. They were arguing that these land policies did not fit African 
realities, where land is far from being simply an economic resource for agricultural 
production, constituting rural, poor people’s livelihoods. The reality is rather that land 
in many developing countries is also a social, cultural and ontological resource, as 
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well as a political resource (Okoth-Ogendo 2006). Resource-scholars thus emphasize 
that local contexts and culture are decisive factors for access to land and natural 
resources. Sara Berry is one of the most significant of these scholars. She states that 
land ownership in Africa tend to have a communal character in opposition to western 
notions of individualized ownership (Berry 1993). Property rights are from her 
perspective seen as social processes defined by complex, social, relationships between 
and within communities and between communities and the state (Berry 1993; Boone 
2007). Hence rights to land are rendered fluid and dynamic, as they are subject to 
constant renegotiation. This imply that the process of altering governing rules of land 
in an agrarian society through land reform, obfuscates and redefines social 
relationships within and between communities. 
Towards the turn of the twenty-first century, scholars increasingly started to make a 
distinction between state-provided rights and the processes of what people actually do 
to secure their access to land. This distinction is facilitated by a growing recognition 
of powerful customary and informal, local level institutions, which compete with state 
institutions for power, authority and granting of rights to land (Peters 2004; Juul and 
Lund 2002). The crucial point is that states might grant an individual rights to a plot 
of land, but this does not necessarily lead to de facto access to this piece of land. 
Ribot and Peluso (2003), in their article A Theory of Access, completed an operational 
access framework, in which they distinguish between property and access. Property is 
defined as the right to a resource, and access as the ability to benefit from the 
resource, highlighting that the ability to actually use and benefit from resources is 
determined by a range of factors and not just property rights alone. Ribot and Peluso 
(2003) suggest nine structural and relational categories of access mechanisms (means 
of access): rights, technology, capital, markets, labor and labor opportunity, 
knowledge, authority, social identity and negotiation of other social relations. These 
categories echo the five capitals – natural, physical, human, financial and social – and 
modifying factors – social relations, institutions and organizations – found in the 
sustainable livelihoods framework (Ellis 2000; Scoones 1998). An individual’s 
bundles of power determine one’s ability to gain, maintain and control resource 
access. The sets of acts that different actors perform to defend – or entrench and 
expand – their position is in Ribot’s later work referred to as repertories of dominance 
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(Poteete and Ribot 2011). The access framework is underlining the argument that 
access is fundamentally unequal and socially differentiated.  
Plural sources of power and authority in regards to land and the subsequent inequality 
and social differentiation in gaining access are dominant themes within recent 
academic overviews over land tenure issues (Sikor and Lund 2009). Scholars place 
land tenure within the dynamics of political authority, citizenship and belonging 
(Lund and Boone 2013; Berry 2009; Lund 2008; Boone 2007) and argue that issues of 
citizenship, political status and political identity determine who can acquire, hold, 
transact or otherwise access land. Land’s linkage to citizenship and belonging is 
evident, as most claims to land in Sub-Saharan Africa are based on social identity. 
Many scholars argue that increased land scarcity fuels politics of identity and 
belonging on all socio-economic levels, defining who is insiders and who is outsiders, 
thereby determining who is entitled to land ownership and who is not (Lund 2008; 
Berry 2002).  
Christian Lund is a prominent advocate of the strong interconnectedness between land 
tenure issues and dynamics of political authority. Land rights and land tenure are, in 
his view, to be seen as a dynamic and renegotiable set of rules governing land (Lund 
2008). Struggles over land in post-colonial Africa are from this perspective closely 
interlinked with issues of power and legitimacy of competing claims to authority 
(Berry 2002). In most of these post-colonial African states, land is placed in a 
situation of legal pluralism, as both customary and state law hold legitimacy and tend 
to overlap in their jurisdiction (ibid). Lund examines land tenure as the outcome of 
competition between institutions on the local level, where state institutions hold no 
privileged position (Lund 2008). He approaches these arenas of local politics of land 
as platforms and theaters of on-going negotiations (ibid). 
3.2. The role of identity in claim making: the production of ethnicity 
as identity 
As scrutinized above, social identity and belonging are frequently essential for 
determining who can acquire, hold, transact or otherwise access land in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (Lund 2008). Scholars argue that increased land scarcity fuels politics of 
identity, and hardens the distinction between insiders and outsiders (Lund 2008; 
Peters 2004). Theoretical literatures have examined politics of identity and processes 
	   13	  
of inclusion and exclusion in terms of different markers of group identities, such as 
ethnicity, religion, class and gender (Peters 2004; Berry 1993). As this report 
examines the causality between ethnic federalism and violent conflicts, we here 
explore academic discourse on ethnicity as boundary formation between groups. 
However, it is important to note that other markers of identity may hold great 
importance in the case of Ethiopia, but is beyond the scope of this report. Debelo 
(2012) underlines that: 
“Ethnicity – as a marker of groups’ distinctiveness, sense of self-identification 
and ascription of others – determines the nature of inter-group interaction” 
(Debelo 2012:518).  
Boundary formation between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is a common phenomenon in the history 
of society and is not a problem per se (Debelo 2012). But competition and enmity will 
arise, if the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ starts to polarize, in the sense that 
images of cultural, historical and political antagonism emerge. A range of authors 
point to the fact that ethnic identity is rooted in pre-existing cultural and historic 
elements, but simultaneously reaffirm that ethnic identity is constantly reconstructed, 
redefined and sometimes even used as instruments of political mobilization, as a 
response to changing realities and interest (Smith 2000; Debelo 2012; Nanda and 
Warms 2006). Debelo (2012) explains that in the process of ethnic reconstruction,  
“(…) ethnic actors or elites reinterpret past historical incidents, connect them 
to present and render them meaningful in the context of a group’s economic, 
political, social and ideological interest.” (Debelo 2012:518).  
This process is similar to what Debelo (2012) refers to as situational construction of 
identity, which takes place on the basis of interests and motives. This kind of strategic 
(re)invention and (re)construction of ethnic identity is carried out by ethnic 
entrepreneurs (Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008; Abbink 2007; Milas and Latif 2000; 
Debelo 2012). They tend to be manipulative ethnic elites or spokesmen, who 
articulate claims to resources and power based on references to cultural and language 
differences, as well as sentiments of being historically disadvantaged and 
marginalized (Abbink 2007). The concept of switching loyalty (Elwert 2002) can be 
seen as the manifestation of situational construction of identity and difference. It 
describes individuals’ or groups’ shifts in loyalty, alliance, and identity, from one 
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partnership to another, according to various motives. Knight (1992) speaks of 
distributive bargaining, as the struggle and negotiation based on either power 
asymmetry or symmetry that leads to the distributional outcome of benefits from 
common property resources.  
With the use of these ethnic positioning strategies and manipulative negotiation 
techniques, ethnic entrepreneurs make individual claims disguised as collective 
grievance, thereby seeking to get advantages at the expense of other ethnic groups 
(Abbink 2006). The benefits of ethnic entrepreneurship tend not to reach the true 
marginalized individuals within the entrepreneurs’ own ethnic groups (Devereaux 
2010). Based on distributive bargaining power and strategic construction of identity, 
individuals and groups are able to navigate (Vigh 2009) in the ever-changing social 
and political landscape. Henrik Vigh has in his work on contemporary African youth 
developed the notion of social navigation, which he defines as “the act of moving in 
an environment that is wavering and unsettle” (Vigh 2009:420). He states that in 
settings characterized by “certain uncertainty and predictable instability” (Vigh 
2009:422), people have to be flexible and creative in finding ways of surviving and 
creating meaningful lives (ibid). With the concept of social navigation, he sheds light 
on the interaction between the social agent and the social environment, which 
otherwise tend to be treated as two separate perspectives (ibid). Analysis should from 
this perspective unfold agency of the ethnic entrepreneurs, as well as the structures 
and rules they have to act within. 
In order to grasp the causal relation between an ethnic-based state organization, 
ethnicity, as a strategic and navigational tool used by elites to further interest, and the 
formation of rivalry and conflict, we outline the paradigms of pastoral conflict in the 
following section. 
3.3. Paradigms of pastoral conflicts 
Pastoral and ethnic conflicts have been widely discussed in literature (Lake and 
Rotchild 1998; Horowitz 1985; Hagmann 2005). The various explanations of the 
emergence of these conflicts build upon different disciplinary traditions and schools 
of thought. Social anthropologists have tended to take a primordialist perspective on 
pastoralist violence, viewing violence as an integral part of pastoral life and culture. 
From this viewpoint, violence naturally arises due to pastoralists’ fragmented kinship, 
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segmentary clan politics and aggressive behavior. Primordialist thinking of pastoral 
conflicts has enjoyed great popularity in explaining conflicts in the Horn of Africa 
(Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008), but has met substantial criticism from a younger 
generation of anthropologists, ecologists and pastoral activists. They proclaim that 
primodialist thinking is a reproduction of colonial imaginative geographies of the 
savage and aggressive nature of nomadic communities, aiming to legitimize 
suppression of these communities.  
An alternative explanation of pastoral conflicts comes from the environmental 
conflict paradigm, which, from a Malthusian perspective, argues that pastoral 
conflicts are results of relative of absolute resource scarcity (e.g. Meier et al. 2007; 
Homer-Dixon 1994, 1999). They point to population growth and a diminishing 
natural resource base as key factors causing pastoral competition and violence. The 
environmental conflict theory does however tend to fall short, as statistical data 
supporting this assumption is largely absent. Critical voices express that it neglects 
pastoralists’ agency and adaptive ability to changing climatic conditions (Hagmann 
2005; Peluso and Watts 2001). The critics further argue that environmental conflict 
theory fail to recognize the institutional arrangements, changing policies and politics 
behind resource scarcity (Bogale and Korf 2007; Tache and Oba 2009). They further 
advocate for the need to trace back into social, political and economic processes in the 
past in order to understand the fundamental reasons for unequal access to resources 
(Peluso and Watts 2001; Berry 2002). Peluso and Watts (2001) does, in continuation 
of this, view violence as a “site-specific phenomenon rooted in local histories and 
social relations yet connected to larger processes of material transformations and 
power relations.” (Peluso and Watts 2001:5).  
The growing recognition of the importance of institutional arrangements and state 
policies in resource conflict generation among pastoralists in the Horn of Africa, has 
increased academic attention on the role of the state: “The role of the state in 
initiating conflicts is frequently overlooked” (Tache and Oba 2009:410). Despite the 
establishment of this point of view, interpretations of pastoral violence still tend to be 
depoliticed and characterized by assumptions of primordial antagonism and resource 
scarcity (Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008). In this paper, we adopt the approach of 
Hagmann and Mulugeta (2008), in the attempt to understand the interrelations 
between state-building and pastoral conflicts.  
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4. Results Part I: The Ethiopian case 
In 1991, in the aftermath of decades of civil war, insurgency and oppressive 
authoritarian regimes, the new government of Ethiopia under the stewardship of the 
Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) reconfigured the 
Ethiopian state structure into a federation based on ethno-linguistic differences (Milas 
and Latif 2000; Tache and Oba 2009; Abbink 2006). The ambition behind the federal 
philosophy was to solve the ‘national question’ on how to address historical 
inequalities in power, cultural prestige and resources between the various ethnic 
groups of Ethiopia, and further how to secure internal peace among them (Abbink 
2006; Debelo 2012). 
Today, 24 years after the territorial reconfiguration, Ethiopia is against expectations 
facing increased frequency of inter-ethnic, violent confrontations within its national 
borders (Unruh 2005:230; Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008; Abbink 2006). These 
conflicts are especially pronounced in the country’s lowlands, where the majority of 
people are either pastoralists or agro-pastoralists (Coppock 1994; Beyene 2009; 
Debelo 2012). In the process of creating a new federal map of Ethiopia, fluctuating 
administrative lines were drawn and superimposed on the pastoral grazing lands 
previously governed by customary law (Galaty 2013; Tache and Oba 2009). For 
pastoral communities, borders and access to pastoral resources, such as grazing lands 
and water sources, traditionally have been accessed through fluid and negotiable 
systems. The new policy of ethnic federalism did not take into account the contexts of 
different lifestyles of Ethiopia, and neglected the importance of pastoral cross-border 
mobility, thereby creating multiple conflicts (Debelo 2012; Bogale and Korf 2009).  
4.1. Pastoral livelihoods in the Ethiopian lowlands   
The Ethiopian lowlands are today often described as peripheral and, at least to some 
extend, marginalized (Devereux 2010). Using a 1500-m threshold, the lowlands 
constitute 61 percent of Ethiopia’s total land surface (Coppock 1994, see map p. 17), 
but however only support 15 percent of the total population (Abdulahi 2007). The 
Ethiopian lowlands, regions often characterized as ‘backward’ or ‘emerging’ 
(Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008), are known for its diverse array of pastoral and agro-
pastoral groups, whom to a large degree derive their livelihoods from livestock 
rearing (Coppock 1994). A fundamental feature of traditional pastoralism is that it 
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relies on mobility and efficient 
use of fluctuating resources in 
an otherwise harsh environment 
(in this case arid or semi-arid 
rangelands). Daily, seasonal or 
yearly movement is used to 
counter changing weather 
patterns, and helps to ensure 
sustainable use of resources. 
Pastoralist lifestyles thus rely on 
the freedom of movement, with 
important principles being; 
flexibility, complementarity 
multi-functionality and 
reciprocity (Abdulahi 2007).  
When we in this report refer to ‘pastoralist’ or ‘pastoralism’ it is terms, covering the 
rural dwellers in these lowlands, who mainly practice transhumant herding or agro-
pastoral livestock production to sustain their livelihoods. This does, however, not 
exclude the importance of other significant sources of income, which may include 
petty or cross-border trade, wage labor, remittances and humanitarian aid (Hagmann 
and Mulugeta 2008).   
It remains clear that Ethiopia’s pastoral groups differ greatly (Abdulahi 2007). 
Hagmann and Mulugeta (2008) nevertheless see that Ethiopia’s pastoral groups in 
general share three characteristics. These characteristics are important to note when 
discussing the interactions between the state and pastoral groups. One common 
characteristic is that most of these groups rely on a segmentary kinship structure 
based on clan or linage. Also, these groups have an age- or generational hierarchy, 
which determines their internal power relations. Thirdly, customary leaders play an 
eminent role in managing public affairs (Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008). In addition to 
this, it must be added, that the diverse pastoralist population share a common 
inharmonious relationship with the state, which most notably has to do with 
historically fluctuating administrative borders being imposed on hitherto traditionally 
administered grazing lands (Tache and Oba 2009). 
Map of the Ethiopian lowlands  
(Source: Cossins and Upton 1985). 
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 Land tenure and legal frameworks in Ethiopia have through history remained silent 
on the rights of pastoralists to access key resources and to move freely between these 
in seasons of need (Mulatu and Bekure 2013). Within recent years the EPRDF 
government has however been successful in fostering the emergence of a loyal 
pastoral elite, while pastoralist interests also have been institutionalized in the 
parliament. This has to be understood in the light of a new profitability for 
policymakers in the involvement in the representation of pastoral interests. The 
welfare of Ethiopian pastoralist has entered into the global discourse of the rights of 
indigenous people, leading to large-scale efforts in providing humanitarian relief and 
development programs. Therefore, the field of pastoralism has gained new attention 
on a number of arenas, encompassing also the central state (Hagmann and Mulugeta 
2008). However, as seen in the words of Devereux (2010) ‘… Ethiopian pastoralists 
are incontrovertibly a ‘peripheral’ group in relation to the ‘farmer-centric’ core’ 
(Devereux 2010:679). 
The relationships between the state, pastoralist, and conflicts have to be situated a 
historical context of neglect and omissions, and has roots that can be traced back to as 
long as the establishment of the ‘modern’ nation of Ethiopia. As the following shows, 
ethnic differentiation and the institutionalization of ethnic federalism has exacerbated 
and fuelled group polarization. Simultaneously, cross-border mobility and flexibility 
has been reduced (Tache and Oba 2009;), customary institutions have eroded 
(Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008), and failed or missing land policies have challenged 
tenure security (Mulatu and Bekure 2013). This consequently affects pastoral 
lifestyles and is important in an analysis of pastoral conflicts. All are aspects that 
mark the way land access is achieved, and thus also mark the way we have to 
maneuver our analysis. In sum, the latter has profound consequences for how we have 
to look at and understand pastoral conflicts in contemporary Ethiopia. 
4.2. Historical relations between the state and its lowland periphery   
Surrounding the central highlands and situated in the country’s border regions, the 
Ethiopian lowlands are literally located in the periphery of the central state. This is 
not negligible when seeking to unfold the nature of inter-ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia’s 
post-1991 context. Historically, power in Ethiopia has emanated from the northern 
highlands, and it was from here that Emperor Menelik II became the only black 
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African leader to actively participate in the 1880s scramble for Africa (Debelo 2012). 
Emperor Menelik II managed to conquer and incorporate the then autonomous states 
of south, southwestern and southeastern Ethiopia into his, giving Ethiopia its present 
geographical shape (Ibid.). The new northern rulers confiscated two-thirds of the land 
in the southern regions, making the population tenants of the new northern landlords 
(Milas and Latif 2000). Much of the later ethnic antagonisms and conflict can be 
traced back to the early twentieth century’s institutionalization of the northern feudal 
system of exploitation, as “It was this historical experience of domination, 
exploitation, and oppression that since the 1960s, triggered the subjected peoples to 
revitalize their ethnic identity and to articulate ethnic-based political movements 
against the Amhara/Ethiopian hegemony” (Debelo 2012:521).   
In 1974 the imperial government under Haile Selassie was overthrown in a military 
coup led by a group of junior military officers known as the Derg. The socialist Derg 
made their takeover in the mist of a popular uprising. It came at a time where a 
growing educated middleclass was failing to find job opportunities, instead becoming 
discontented and radicalized. Concurrently, the situation was exacerbated by the 
(resource-) antagonism between the ruling parties and the lowland periphery of the 
state, dating back to the North-South divisions (Milas and Latif 2000). The radical 
groups fighting the imperial regime expected that a military coup would bring them to 
power, however the Derg (1994-91) refused to comply with the demands articulated 
in the uprising and rejected talks of sharing power. What followed was an era of terror 
and famine. The Derg’s refusal to share power sparked the creation of several armed 
opposition groups. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), the Tigray 
People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) 
respectively fought for the independence of Eritrea and regional autonomy (Milas and 
Latif 2000; Debelo 2012). The Derg’s strategy of suppression and waging wars 
against whole communities or ethnic groups further spurred the rebellion, making 
ethnicity an effective tool for mobilization. Previously Ethiopia’s diverse cultural 
communities had been linked together by shared cultural beliefs and an idea of a 
common political and social authority. The Derg’s weight on crushing rebellion by 
military force effectively put an end to this. Instead it contributed to ethnic separatism 
and resistance towards the polity of the Ethiopian state (Milas and Latif 2000).  
Consequently, when the Derg regime was finally ousted in 1991 by the EPRDF, it led 
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to a fundamental transformation of the philosophy of the Ethiopian state (Debelo 
2012). It was clear that the unity of the Ethiopian state was week and unstable, and 
that something had to be done to solve the ‘national question.’ From here on ethnic 
differentiation entered the formal political scene and became institutionalized through 
its policy of ethnic federalism.  
4.3. Ethnic federalism, decentralization, and essentialization of 
ethnicity 
As seen above, ethnicity has been a central aspect of Ethiopian politics since the 
rising discontent with the imperial regime in the 1960s. The new post-1991 EPRDF 
government saw it necessary to address the ‘national question’ essentially dealing 
with inequalities of power, self-government and the distribution of resources between 
the many diverse ethno-linguistic groups (Abbink 2006). The aim of the new 
philosophy of the state came from an ambition to create: 
“… A renewed, ‘revolutionary-democratic’ state, with more rights to be 
accorded to neglected minorities and language groups, and aiming for a 
decentralized, ethno-linguistically-based federation instead of an enforced 
unitary state.” (Abbink 2006:389).  
The state narrative from then on became that Ethiopia as a nation should only be a 
loosely collection of ethno-linguistically different groups, however maintaining an 
overarching national state framework. Envisioned was a decentralized and democratic 
solution to the longstanding problems of national unity (Abbink 2006; Debelo 2012). 
The central principle of the new philosophy was to grant rights of self-determination 
to the diverse groups within the federal state, and in 1992 the government presented a 
new regional map of Ethiopia. It proposed the creation of 14 administrative federal 
regions (Kilils, meaning ‘reserve’ or ‘fenced territory’). The borders were generally 
made up according to ethno-linguistic differences and ideology, not including 
‘geographic and economic-ecological common sense’ (Abbink 2006:393). However, 
as noted by several scholars (Abbink 2006; Abdulahi 2007), not all of Ethiopia’s 
approximately 75 different ethnic groups were granted their own state. Thus the 
national question was not solved, as the problems of ethnic diversity and lack of 
representation continued. With the creation of administrative regions, problems were 
only decentralized and moved closer towards lower levels of the administration. The 
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risk of discrimination endured, as potential discrimination of minorities was not 
solved, but only moved to the regional state, which then had to deal with the potential 
problems of an ethnically mixed population (Abbink 2006). Therefore, the policy of 
ethnic federalism has received a vast amount of criticism. It has been blamed as the 
root cause for most of Ethiopia’s contemporary inter-ethnic conflicts, with the main 
argument being that the policy has been divisive and generating conflict by hardening 
group boundaries (Debelo 2012). On the other hand, the policy has been praised for 
being perhaps the only way to redress past ethnic-based injustices, ensuring 
democratization between groups (Ibid.).  
Ethnic federalism has meant that the possession of control over territorially defined 
administrative unit is crucial for a group’s entitlement to political resources (Debelo 
2012). Thus, for pastoralists this has had significant impacts on traditionally flexible 
and negotiable systems of cross-border mobility. The post-1991 political order, with 
its institutionalization of ethnic federalism, meant an increased pressure for 
‘voluntary’ sedentarization, adversely impacting communal landholding (Abdulahi 
2007; Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008). The policy did not take into account the 
contexts of different group lifestyles, thus neglecting pastoral needs for flexibility and 
cross-border movement (Bogale and Korf; Debelo 2012). Particular problematic has 
also been the polarization of ethno-linguistic groups and the “essentialisation” of 
ethno-cultural and linguistic differences, which has come to redefine group relations 
(Abbink 2006:391). 
“… One of the most unintended effects of ethnic politics is that it promotes 
differences and hardens inter-ethnic boundaries. This exacerbates the 
construction of the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’, including the readjustment of past 
history, memories, labels, and stereotypes to match the present motives of 
ethnic entrepreneurs.” (Debelo 2012:528)   
The new politics of ethnicity has had profound consequences for the nature of 
conflicts over resources in the lowlands, as all land in reality is under state ownership. 
Often customary tenure systems regulate rights of access and use over land formally 
held by the state (Berry 1993), but the state retains the power to allocate land, which 
imply that land can be used by people, but at all times be confiscated, used, and 
redistributed at will of the regional authorities and federal government (Galaty 2013; 
Abbink 2006). This de facto means that no one can legitimately claim land, making it 
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widely contested by local ethnic groups. In this sense, ethnic federalism has come to 
shape the discourse of inter-ethnic relationships, as ethnicity has come to the forefront 
of any claim making over resources (Abbink 2006). In the following, we delve into 
how land tenure, legitimacy and claim making have been altered as a result of the 
post-1991 political order.  
4.4. Land tenure and policies of sedentarization 
It remains essential to understand the nature of the land tenure regime, as it shapes the 
way various actors access and control resources. It determines processes of inclusion 
and exclusion, and who has the ability to benefit from which resources, when and 
how (Peters 2004; Ribot and Peluso 2003). Abbink (2006) states that in rural 
Ethiopia:  
“The majority of conflicts (…) emerged from disputes on land and boundaries 
of districts and zones between newly defined ethnic or linguistic groups” 
(Abbink 2006:396).  
With the creation of federal Ethiopia this is important to understand as “Ethnicity and 
regional identity in Ethiopia are closely linked to land tenure and access to state 
power and resources, and thus generate strife among ethnic groups” (Milas and Latif 
2000:366). The installment of ethnic federalism has hence exacerbated land’s role as a 
political resource (Okoth-Ogendo 2006; Lund 2008). We therefore here provide a 
closer look at the Ethiopian land tenure regime, looking a both the past and the 
present. We pay special attention to the lowland pastoral areas, but in doing so we 
need to place them within a national context.  
Pastoral land has traditionally been communally owned, and administered by 
customary institutions. The communal tenure arrangements include rules and 
regulations aimed at harmonizing ecological, economic and social benefits. However, 
during the imperial period all land that was not under permanent cultivation or 
settlement became considered government property. In 1955, a revised constitution 
came to state that all pastoral land was state property, thereby effectively depriving 
pastoralist their communal rights (Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008; Abdulahi 2007). 
Through history consecutive governments have enforced policies and programs 
undermining communal tenure and eroding the authority of customary institutions. In 
fact, government interventions have decreased livestock mobility, supported agro-
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industrial projects, and promoted sedentarization (Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008). 
Changes occurred in 1975, when all land became nationalized by the socialist Derg 
regime. At first this was widely appreciated in the lowlands, as land was distributed to 
the local peasantry. The popularity, however, soon vanished as tax burdens increased 
and destitute farmers from the North resettled onto the land (Milas and Latif 2000). In 
1984-85 Ethiopia experienced famine, partly due to the Derg’s ‘disastrous’ 
agricultural policies. These policies included a land reform diminishing land holdings, 
as well as forcing the population to work on unproductive state farms (Milas and Latif 
2000:366). This further spurred sedentarization of the lowlands’ pastoral population, 
and in reality kept pastoralist from land ownership (Abdulahi 2007).    
After the fall of the Derg regime, the new EPRDF government in 1991 announced the 
continuation of this land policy, until a referendum would decide the fate of the tenure 
arrangements of the country. However, the referendum never took place, and instead 
the state ownership of land, granting only usufruct rights to land holders, became 
inscribed and approved in the 1995 constitution (Crewett and Korf 2008). In Ethiopia 
today, the existing legal framework for land tenure contains no specific provisions 
pertaining to pastoral lands (Mulatu and Bekure 2013), however the federal 
constitution of 1995 says that, 
‘Ethiopian pastoralists have the right to free land for grazing and cultivation 
as well as the right not to be displaced from their own lands’ (FDRE 1995, 
Art. 40).  
This has however not led to any significant attempts to legally acknowledging the 
existence of the pastoral communal landholding system (Abdulahi 2007). Several 
scholars argue that the lack of formal pastoral rights in the Ethiopian land tenure 
regime is a manifestation of the favoring of sedentary agriculture and large 
plantations (Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008; Mulatu and Bekure 2013; Debelo 2012; 
Abdulahi 2007). As part of the politics of ethnicity, the central government has been 
conferring power to regional states in order for them to be able to enact their own 
laws, within the federal administrative system. Currently the Afar Regional State has 
progressed far on this, while e.g. the Somali Regional State is only at an early stage in 
drafting its land policy (Mulatu and Bekure 2013). The current state ownership of 
land essentially means that the local people can use the communal grazing lands, but 
that the regional or federal state retains the power to confiscate or redistribute land at 
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any time (Abbink 2006). The collapse of customary institutions, as well as the 
inability of the central state to enforce communal property rights, has led to ‘de facto 
open-access tenure regimes,’ stimulating violent conflicts, which are triggered by 
multiple claims to the same resource pool (Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008:24). The 
customary institutions eroded gradually, but are still a preferred conflict resolution 
tool by virtually all pastoralist communities. However, the state has been ambiguous 
in using these institutions, meaning that only certain clan leaders (or similar 
customary leaders) have been selected or recognized by the state. Thus, customary 
leaders have lost legitimacy, as they are seen as the government’s appointees, and 
therefore not a true representation of their respective groups (Hagmann and Mulugeta 
2008). Conversely, conflict resolution has become a lucrative business for some 
customary leaders, who is paid by either government or NGOs to implement certain 
agendas in return for receiving per diems or other personal benefits (Ibid.), which is 
outlined in chapter 6.  
5. Results Part II: The ambiguous role of the state  
The scholarly discussions included in this essay highlight numerous political, social, 
economic and environmental aspects that can be applied to pastoral conflicts. As the 
previous sections have shown, the state, and its policy of ethnic federalism, has 
significantly altered how struggles over resources are managed. It has led to the 
erosion of customary institutions, and subsequently generated strife between ethnic 
groups. In the following three results parts, we seek to link the scholarly discussions 
and concepts to the reality of ethnic federalism and pastoral conflicts. This chapter’s 
focal point is the Ethiopian state apparatus, unfolding the implications of ethnic 
federalism at the local level. We thereby dig into the substance of the matter, linking 
theory and reality. 
5.1. Ethnic federalism and the ambiguous role of the state 
As earlier stated, ethnic federalism was installed in 1991 as an attempt to solve the 
national question, rooted in inequalities of power, resource distribution, and the 
determination for increased self-governance. Although inter-group conflicts were 
evident already in pre-1991 Ethiopia, conflicts have undoubtedly become more 
frequent and aggravated (Abbink 2006; Debelo 2012). Markakis (2003), in his 
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excellent article The Anatomy of a Conflict: Afar and Ise Ethiopia, demonstrates how 
the government’s irresolute establishment of ethnic federalism has complicated 
territorial disputes further. He shows how the Afar and the Somali Issa [Ise], both 
pastoral ethnic groups, share a long history of violent struggles over pastures and 
waterholes. The Somali Issa has through history pressed into the Afar’s traditional 
land in an expansion from the south. In 1991, with the federalization of Ethiopia, each 
group was given their own regional state in an attempt to defuse the conflict between 
them. However, the border between the two states was never settled upon, as both 
groups made conflicting claims to the important pastures of the Alligendhi plain, and 
parts of the road going to Djibouti. The latter has come to serve as a lucrative source 
of revenues. It was left up to the new regional states to resolve the issue, however 
they were not able to. Therein lies a potent part of the conflict (Markakis 2003). The 
policy of ethnic federalism did not solve Ethiopia’s inter-group problems, but rather 
decentralized them from the federal to the regional state(s). It has, as Abbink (2006) 
says, “led to a localization of conflicts away from challenging the central state” 
(Abbink 2006:391). In that sense, ethnic federalism might be regarded useful and 
somewhat successful. The federal state manages to control political and economic 
decisions at the center, but disclaims responsibility for the development of conflicts at 
regional or local levels. Hence, it is contested if there has ever been any true 
federalization, as the regional autonomy is not respected. The federal state maintains 
control over all financial and budgetary decisions, and the ability to interfere 
regionally at will, also militarily (Abbink 2006). The state thus takes on an ambiguous 
role in its dealings with inter-group conflicts in and between the regional states, which 
were created with the aim to do just that. 
“The goals of state policy at the local levels may appear cryptic, but skeptics 
would infer that the state involvements are aimed at pre-empting community 
support for the armed groups by creating inter-community discord and 
denying them grounds for building joint political alliances against the state.” 
(Tache and Oba 2009:419) 
The administrative borders drawn, together with the incumbent need to control 
administration, are at the forefront of the problem. There are multiple examples of the 
ambiguous role that the federal state has played in reconfiguring conflicts. In the case 
of the disputes between the Borana and Somali groups on the borders of Oromia and 
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Somali regional states, the state has been caught in between, having to side with one 
of the disputing parties. The dispute shares many similarities with the one described 
above between the Afar and Issa. It also involves a long administrative border with a 
mixed resident population, with Somali groups expanding from the Ogaden. Tache 
and Oba (2009) put the conflict into a historical perspective of the state’s dealings 
with its unstable periphery. The Ogaden, now the Somali regional state, has a history 
of longstanding struggle for independence from Ethiopia. Referring to the ‘Ogaden 
question,’ Tache and Oba show how the previous imperial and Derg regimes have 
tried to tackle the Ogadaen using military force. The post-1991 EPRDF government 
made a move away from military force, instead imposing the recognition and right to 
self-administration. Deviously, the state, along with the recognition of the right for 
self-administration, “apparently made land concessions, which in the case of the 
Ogaden might serve as a containment policy” (Tache and Oba 2009:419). The Somali 
takeover of traditional land, as witnessed both in Afar and here in Oromia, was hence 
to some extend terminated by the state. However, it also created a number of 
interfaces of conflict between both the two ethnic groups, but also between the 
Borana and the state. The Borana continuously fight the Somali over the land that 
they perceive as their ancestral land, while the state has become unpopular after the 
recognition of the Somali occupancy of Borana territory.  
5.2. Shifting state support 
As seen in the latter case between the Borana and Somali groups, the issue becomes 
the conflicting systems for determining rights to resources. When settling boundaries, 
it is contested if attention is to be paid to historical domain or occupancy and usufruct 
rights (Tache and Oba 2009).  In 2004 a number of state-supported referendums were 
held to definitively settle the border between the two regional states. However, this 
effectively undermines customary tenure and places increased pressure on the 
communal grazing lands. The referendum led to each ethnic group claiming little 
parcels of land, which were to be linked to the regional state that they were 
linguistically affiliated with. This meant that e.g. the Somalis living in Oromia where 
able to claim that they belonged under the administration of the Somali regional state, 
and vice versa. As the Somalis had been successful in occupying many of the 
important wells and pastures in the area, as many of the Boranas were internally 
displaced after violent confrontations. For the referendum displaced Boranas were 
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unable to return to their former territories to vote, which was ignorantly assessed as 
“withdrawal from voting” (Tache and Oba 2009:422). This had adverse impacts for 
the Borana. 
“For Borana, the effects of the political development was the loss of access to 
traditional home rangelands and the key wells, which caused internal 
competition over the reduced environmental space, generating dilemma in 
livelihood responses and creating greater risks to drought and poverty” 
(Tache and Oba 2009:420).  
Tache and Oba quote a Borana community spokesperson for stating that the 
referendum could be equated with ‘a guest demanding to vote on the ownership of the 
home that hosted him’ (quoted in Tache and Oba 2009:420). Historical practices and 
unfair conditions were thus overheard in the state’s ‘practical’ solution to the dispute. 
Ethnic federalism has become a tool that one group can use to protect new gains, 
while opponent groups may experience it as a historical loss. Tache and Oba thus 
concludes that: 
“(…) The manner in which the state handled the conflict, instead of 
addressing the root causes of the problem, could in future complicate the 
relationship between the opposing pastoral groups.” (Tache and Oba 
2009:421).  
This stresses the need for looking to understand pastoral conflicts through a political 
ecology lens, and in this case look especially at social and political causes of violence. 
This is not to disregard the importance of physical resources, the shrinking natural 
base, population pressure and the issue of new important incomes. However, these 
cases show that even though the dispute may be over resources, social-political 
elements cannot be disregarded in an understanding of inter-ethnic pastoral conflicts. 
Historically shifting state support plays an immense role in the relationship between 
ethnic groups, as dynamics of political status determine who can access and control 
land and redefine social relationships in and between communities (Lund 2008; Berry 
1993). Abdulahi (2005), referring to the Boran-Digodi conflicts, finds that:  
“The current regime may also be reluctant to intervene because it has sought 
to distance itself from the legacy of the monarchy and Derg, who were 
perceived as being biased in their involvement (…)” (Abdulahi 2005:5). 
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The historical aspects of state’s role in generating and managing conflict has similarly 
been shown by Abbink (2006) in his description of the Nuer-Anywaar dispute in the 
Gambela regional state, and by Debelo (2012) in the case of the Burji-Guji conflict in 
Oromia regional state. Both cases similarly aggravated by the shifting state support 
between the clashing groups, igniting disagreements, mistrust and polarization.   
5.3. The creation of power asymmetry  
State interference has also affected conflicts through the creation of power 
asymmetry. Asymmetry leads to unbalanced distribution of resources and it thus 
negatively affecting inter-ethnic relationships. Relying on the concepts from 
distributive bargaining theory (Knight 1992), Beyene (2009) shows how the state has 
effectively increased the power asymmetry between the Issa and the Oromo Ittu. As 
both the state and customary institutions fail in providing secure property rights, it 
become ‘legitimate’ for the claimant parties to invest in conflict to secure access 
through violence (Ribot and Peluso 2003). State policies, as previously shown, 
supports crop production, and as the Ittu has taken up agriculture as a diversification 
strategy, while the Issa wish to sustain pastoralism as a livelihood, it has led to 
conflicts over the distribution of resources. The two actors are pursuing different 
production systems and strive to consolidate their physical power as a method to 
constrain each other’s access. The Issa are able to mobilize more easily, and are in 
possession of more weapons than the Ittu. There are two reasons for this. One is that 
the Somali Issa moves more freely across the international border into Somalia. 
Secondly, the state has been actively disarming the Ittu. Previously, the Ethiopian 
Derg regime had otherwise equipped the Ittu with arms during the border war 
between Ethiopia and Somalia, supporting them in their fight against the Somali Issa. 
However, now disarmament is taking place. This happens for political reasons, as the 
government fears that the Ittu may have ties to the Oromo Liberation Front, which has 
been labeled a terrorist organization. On the contrary, nothing has been done to 
disarm the Issa. This has gradually created power asymmetry between the two groups. 
Ultimately leading to an unbalanced relationship between the groups, rendering the 
Ittu’s needs illegitimate, while the Issa has become inflexible, avoiding negotiations 
(Beyene 2009).  
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5.4. The context of a moving environment 
The ambiguous role of the state, the erosion of customary institutions, and the lack of 
tenure security create what may be presented as a moving environment (Vigh 2009).  
This concept is beneficial as it helps in providing an understanding of the 
environment that individuals or groups have to move in to secure access and rights to 
resources. The concept underlines:  
“(…) the act of moving in an environment that is wavering and unsettled, and 
when used to illuminate social life it directs our attention to the fact that we 
move in social environments of actors and actants, individuals and 
institutions, that engage and move us as we move along.” (Vigh 2009:420)  
Shrinkage of grazing lands due to expansion of cultivation, population growth, 
environmental degradation and climate change is incessantly putting pressure on 
pastures and water resources, intensifying competition and politics of identity and 
belonging (Haile 2004; Abdulahi 2005; Lund 2008; Berry 2002). Meanwhile, the state 
plays an ambiguous role in co-opting customary institutions and peace mechanism, 
which are further outlined in the following chapter. Ethnic federalism has led to 
conflicts not alone being between individuals or groups, but also between regional 
states and levels of administration. The promotion of sedentary lifestyles favors crop 
production ahead of pastoralism, creating clashes over the use of resources. Lastly, 
customary institutions have eroded, leading to de facto open-access tenure regimes 
and lack of legitimate claim making. In sum this represents an environment, which is 
constantly moving, and where different groups and individuals have to navigate in 
order to secure the best position possible.  
6. Results Part III: Erosion of customary institutions 
The Ethiopian state has, as outlined in the previous section, intervened in (agro)-
pastoral group relations and resource conflicts in numerous ways. According to 
Hagmann and Mulugeta (2008), the Ethiopian state has since 1991 effectively 
transformed how pastoral groups relate to their natural environment. The below 
sections move on to put emphasis on the role of customary institutions and traditional 
peace-making mechanism, unfolding ethnic federalism and its related impacts on 
these.  
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6.1. Altering lifestyles and inter-group relations 
By constraining the traditionally fluid and flexible cross-border mobility patterns of 
pastoralism, ethnic federalism, land tenure policies, and state-led development 
programs have ‘emplaced’ pastoralist groups, thereby successfully generating more 
permanent and sedentarized lifestyles (Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008). In the optic of 
Boone (2007) and Berry (1993), the state-led altering of governing rules of land 
redefines social relationships in and between communities and erodes communal 
traditions. Communal land tenure traditions have generally been characterized by the 
importance of customary authorities, and the willingness to make sharing 
arrangements (Beyene 2009; Bogale and Korf 2007). Herein lies an important critique 
of the environmental security paradigm. Bogale and Korf (2007) depict how pastoral 
and agro-pastoral groups in Daketa Valley in Somali Region are forming cooperative 
sharing arrangements, rather than conflict in times of resource scarcity. Here pastoral 
groups are able to negotiate access to grazing lands in turn for valuable assets to the 
agro-pastoralist. This stands in contrast to the literature linking environmental crisis to 
violent conflicts (Kaplan 2002; Homer-Dixon 1994, 1999). The gradual 
disappearance of traditional, collaborative sharing agreements can be linked to a 
declining resource base, demographic changes, and lastly to what is the core of this 
paper; the political and social changes resulting from state policy. Conflict interests 
are now being defined along identity lines rather than simple resource needs (Beyene 
2009). The installments of ethnic federalism has thus transformed pastoral conflicts 
and complicated traditional conflict mediation mechanisms, weakening their level of 
successfulness. The negotiation practices, carried out by elders to solve disputes 
according to custom, are challenged by the reconfigured nature of the disputes.  
6.2. Selective state recognition of customary institutions 
In the pursuit of ethnic federalism, the Ethiopian state has accorded full recognition to 
customary and religious courts of law in their constitution (FDRE 1995: article 78(5), 
article 34(5)). The constitution thereby gives the federal regions the power to 
recognize customary dispute resolution mechanisms (Unruh 2005). This constitutional 
provision has been the subject of both praise and criticism, as it plays out in various 
ways across the country. A study shows that customary leaders mediate an 
overwhelming majority of violent and non-violent conflicts between people or groups 
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in the lowlands of Ethiopia, based on social norms and rituals (Hagmann and 
Mulugeta 2008), but this takes place in an ambiguous arena of state interference.  
On a positive note, the incorporation of customary authorities has provided cost-
effective conflict mediation mechanisms in a state context, and enhances the 
legitimacy of local customary institutions considerably. In the case of the Afar region, 
Afari elders have become included as local government officials as well, thereby 
enhancing their legitimacy and improving the relationship between the state and local 
customary institutions (Unruh 2005). On the contrary, the formal recognition of 
customary leaders is perceived as a mean to uphold state interest at the local level and 
undermine customary rule (Unruh 2005). In a vast number of empirical cases from the 
pastoral lowlands of Ethiopia, authors report that traditional mediation mechanisms, 
which are culturally accepted negotiation procedures used in case of conflict, have 
eroded and lost their impact (Abbink 2006; Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008; Unruh 
2005). The local government personnel backing the customary custodians are accused 
for being too young, and for being political appointees with other agendas than 
supporting local elders in decision-making (Unruh 2005; Beyene 2009). This brings 
us to the core of the problematic state recognition of local, customary authorities. 
Unruh (2005) points to the fact that:  
“The degree to which governments are willing to operationalize recognition, 
and support local authority structures and customary institutions, can depend 
on the degree to which governments perceive they are able to benefit from the 
arrangement.” (Unruh 2005:234). 
This implies that governments at national, regional and local levels have different 
capacities and willingness to recognize and support customary institutions, and that 
the form and extend of recognition is derived from the expectations of a beneficial 
outcome. This can be illustrated with the case of Somali Region, where state 
recognition and support of customary institutions has been less successful than in the 
previous mentioned case of Afar Region. The state has here been less willing to 
recognize Somali customary leaders, rendering local authority open for fierce 
contestation. Unruh (2005) finds that the Somali clan structure and the historical 
relationship between the Somali and the Ethiopian state are the main reasons for this 
problematic relationship between Somali customary institutions and the local 
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government. Moreover, he suggests that effective state involvement in Somali Region 
represents lesser benefits for the governments (Unruh 2005). 
In the various federal regions, the administrators of the local government have the 
ability to select which customary institutions that are “indigenous” and legitimate 
(Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008). Inherent in this is a dichotomy between traditional 
authorities and recognized officials. Abdulahi captures this by stating that a central 
part of contemporary conflicts lie in the fact that: 
“Traditional leaders who act as representatives of their respective ethnic 
groups feel they possess decision-making powers. On the other hand, young 
government officials from the same ethnic group (the ethnically-based elite) 
possess the state power and claim to have decision-making power.” (Abdulahi 
2005:5) 
The appointed institutions are not necessarily perceived legitimate by the people, as 
local government administrators select them. In such a system, competition arises 
and, if seen through the lens of Ribot and Peluso (2003), ‘powers such as access to 
authority, social relations and financial capital’ can be utilized to receive formal 
recognition as access gatekeepers. The selected local institutions and elders receive 
per diem payments and personal benefits from either regional budgets or NGOs, 
ultimately transforming peace making into a commercialized market characterized by 
incentives for large personal gains (Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008). This serves to 
simultaneously undermine and “retraditionalize” customary authorities, as the 
customary actors are viewed with skepticism by the communities they represent. This 
is further elaborated in the following. 
6.3. Open Access and Violent Confrontations 
Conflict has become more frequent as ethnic federalism and public policies have 
produced more sedentary lifestyles and deteriorated inter-group relations. Customary 
authorities struggle to negotiate conflict solutions, as conflict interest has become 
defined along identity lines rather than simple resource needs (Beyene 2009). The 
public perception that the illegitimate district administration chooses its own elders 
erodes the legitimacy of customary authorities and limits their ability to make and 
enforce peace agreements that have already been agreed up. The outcome is conflict 
resolution efforts that “(…) concentrate more on compensation and punishment of the 
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wrongdoer, rather than developing clear rules of resource use.” (Beyene 2009:229). 
Empirical evidence from the violent conflict between the Issa and Ittu clans in the 
Somali Region show that the effects of the negotiation processes are short-lived 
(Beyene 2009). They divert attention from the underlying structural causes of 
protracted conflict such as power asymmetry and unclear property rights for the 
different modes of production. Consequently, pastoralists and agro-pastoralists no 
longer obey rules and regulations for use of grazing commons sanctioned by 
traditional institutions (Unruh 2005). 
In a scenario like this, where customary rules and mediation mechanisms have lost 
their powers, and where the state has not implemented new means of governing 
pastoral resources, resource access is ultimately ‘open’. The management of pastoral 
resources has in this sense shifted from group property management to open access 
lacking any enforceable rules to exclude others. In a situation like this, armed 
confrontation has become the prevailing approach to the exclusion of ‘others’ from 
common grazing resources (Unruh 2005). 
Empirical data from the pastoral lowlands clearly demonstrate that the ability to 
access pastoral resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003) is primarily mediated through 
access to weapons and through social relations to other clan militias, with whom a 
group can form an alliance (Beyene 2009; Abbink 2006; Hagmann and Mulugeta 
2008; Unruh 2005). I.e. in the conflict between the Ittu from the Oromio region and 
Issa from Somali Region, the Issa are showcased as the most powerful group, as they 
are able to confront Ittu violently, when they are unsatisfied or lose patience with 
peaceful negotiation processes (Beyene 2009). It is described how livestock-raid-
related violence tends to break out shortly after mediation and negotiations (Beyene 
2009). The same trend, of violence being the most powerful tool, is seen in the similar 
case of the long and violent conflict between Somali Bantu [e.g. the Reer Barre] and 
other Somali clans. The Somalis are a powerful group simply due to their 
demographically large numbers, compared to other smaller minority clans (Devereux 
2010). The Somali Bantu have been brutally crushed on several occasions, when 
Somali clan militias from the broader region mobilize together, forming a powerful 
and well-armed alliance (Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008). These experiences document 
how customary institutions have limited capacity in managing resource conflict 
between pastoral and agro-pastoral groups. It demonstrates that coercion and violent 
	   34	  
armed confrontations are powerful repertoires of domination (Poteete and Ribot 
2011) in defending, entrenching and expanding control of access to pastoral resources 
in the Ethiopian lowlands. 
7. Results Part IV: Ethnic entrepreneurs 
When examining contemporary inter-ethnic (agro-)pastoral conflicts, it becomes clear 
that the current condition, which we previously described as a moving environment, is 
being adversely utilized by local elites to secure political and personal gains. This is 
happening as a result of the fact that ethno-linguistic differences has been given an 
organizing role in defining boundaries between groups, while the failure of state and 
customary systems leads to de facto open-access tenure regimes. In the following we 
show how ethnic elites, often referred to as ‘ethnic entrepreneurs,’ use the window of 
opportunity, which the policy of ethnic federalism has created, to get advantages at 
the expense of other groups. This is demonstrated using Poteete and Ribot’s concept 
of Repertoires of Domination, defined as “the set of acts actors perform to defend—or 
entrench and expand—their positions” (Poteete and Ribot 2011:439). We further 
incorporate the notions of situational construction of identity (Debelo 2012), 
switching (Elwert 2002) and navigation (Vigh 2009) in order to deeper conceptualize 
the acts performed by actors in processes of strategic positioning and claim-making. 
However, first we need to challenge the appropriateness of the term ‘pastoral 
conflicts.’ 
7.1. New sources of resources: Challenging the notion of “pastoral 
conflicts” 
Digging into the vast literature on pastoral conflict in post-1991 Ethiopia reveals how 
conflicts are results of competition over access to an increasingly diverse array of 
resources, other than merely pastures and wells. Conflicts are thus not only changing 
in nature due to the decentralization’s reconfiguration of pastoralists’ relations to 
territory. Neither is it the changes between customary authorities, and altered relations 
between the competing ethnic groups. With the emergence of new and valuable 
sources of revenues, conflicts are now just as much sparked by competition over 
political power, contested access to public budgets, funds, jobs and investments 
(Abbink 2006; Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008). Marakis (2003) displays how transport 
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routes going through the Afar region has become a contributing factor in the conflict 
between the Afar and Issa. Similarly, Abdulahi (2005), in his analysis of the Boran-
Digodi, shows how access to trade routes and market centers are an emerging source 
of competition between the two groups. In the Issa-Ittu case, competition has taken on 
dimensions of an administrative dispute, as the two groups are now additionally 
striving for the control over Bordede town, which is an important customs point. 
Beyene points out that, “Controlling this town has huge economic benefit attached to 
the revenue generated from tax collection” (Beyene 2009:222). Meanwhile, the 
revenues paid by the federal government and NGO’s in their conflict resolution effort 
has come to serve as a sought after lucrative business (Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008). 
Also, bribes have been seen as an incentive for various actors to get involved in 
conflict management (Beyene 2009). Hagmann and Mulugeta (2008) observe that:  
“Representation at political office, as a potential source of resources, 
subsequently becomes a relay for conflicts between administration personnel 
from neighboring areas” (Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008:30). 
We thus need to reconsider the logic of contemporary conflicts, as it is essentially the 
same groups, who have historically been fighting over scarce natural resources, wells 
and pastures, who are now fighting ‘over increasingly diversified natural, political 
and economic resources’ (Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008:31-32).   
7.2. Claim-making under collective guise 
Having granted ethnicity an organizing role in territorial boundary making, competing 
pastoral groups now frame their claims to resources and political representation in 
ethnic terms (Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008). The advantage of claiming affiliation to 
an ethnically defined group is that it then becomes possible to make individual claims 
to resources under collective guise. 
“Unlike what happened in the past, any dispute on land or land use between 
individuals or households now becomes a collective, community issue, and pits 
communities against each other: this is the logic that must inevitably be 
pursued, and in terms of which the rights can be obtained” (Abbink 
2006:396). 
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At the forefront of this are ethnic entrepreneurs, with ambition in the wider regional 
or national arena. They become active in (re)articulating historical memories, 
connecting them to the present, and thereby rendering them meaningful in the 
perspective of their personal or groups’ social, political and economic interests 
(Debelo 2012). Not only did the decentralization, offered in the policy of ethnic 
federalism, mean that rights to control over territories became sanctioned through 
ethnicity, but it also offered new sources of revenue from decentralized budgets 
(Beyene 2009; Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008). There is thus a lot at stake in the 
process of positioning ethnic groups in this new political order. As Poteete and Ribot 
point out, this is important as, “Decentralization promises to empower local actors, 
but threatens others with a loss of power” (Poteete and Ribot 2011:439). In reaction, 
actors thus use their repertoires of domination to gain, control and maintain the ability 
to access valuable resources. Valuable resources should hence be understood in a 
broad manner, embracing pasture, wells, political representation, jobs, revenues etc. 
In the following, different claim-making strategies and acts of domination are 
presented from different cases. It reflects how ethnic groups, led by ethnic 
entrepreneurs, constantly navigate in the moving environment to consolidate or 
expand their position of power, applying various manipulative negotiation techniques. 
7.3. Acts of domination: strategies of ethnic positioning 
In the quest for domination, actors draw on multiple forms of powers - social, 
political, economic, discursive, coercive, symbolic or material (Poteete and Ribot 
2011). In this ongoing process, actors have access to bundles of power, which may be 
employed in combination or one-by-one. In the context of contemporary conflicts in 
the Ethiopian lowlands, affiliation to an ethnically defined group is the main 
positioning strategy. Belonging to an ethnic group that is deemed indigenous to the 
area, is a powerful tool, portrayed in e.g. the conflicts between the Nuer, Anywaar, 
and five smaller ethnic groups in Gambela regional state (Abbink 2006). 
Approximately 25 percent of the state population is highlanders, who immigrated to 
the area in the course of the past 50 years. These people are excluded from local 
politics, as a logical result of the fact that political administration should be based on 
local ethnicities indigenous to the region.  
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Ethnic identity is in some cases constructed and applied to a very diverse group of 
people with no clear connections, with the aim of forming alliances or to exclude 
others. I.e. in Somali Region, a diverse group of people has recently constructed a 
common ethnic identity, referring to themselves as ‘Bantu’. The Somalis use the 
condescending term jareer – meaning ‘hard hair’ – to Bantu people. The only thing 
that Bantu people have in common is the physical trait of having harder hair than 
ethnic Somalis, low or no status within the Somali lineage system, and being 
subsistence farmers in a predominantly pastoral and agro-pastoral society (Devereaux 
2010). Although identity may be embedded in pre-existing culture, new identities 
have i.e. been developed as a reaction to the shifting realities of the post-1991 
Ethiopian state. For the Bantu people uniting under an ethnic label is a means to 
potentially gain and entrench a position of power, vis-à-vis for the Somalis 
constructing an ethnic stereotype for people outside the Ogaaden genealogical group 
enable them to exclude these from power positions. This case underlines the nature of 
ethnic identity as social and situational constructions, which stands in contrast to 
ethnic federalism’s primodialist concept of unchanging and bounded group identities. 
Ethnic entrepreneurs are key players in the processes of ethnic identity construction or 
revitalization of old ethnic labels of dichotomies among competing groups, as 
outlined in the following: 
 “(…) Perceived cultural-historical differences, ethnic ranking, perceptions of 
disadvantages and grievances are there, and are resuscitated under the 
leadership of aspiring local ethnic elites (often teachers, young community 
leaders, and non-peasant formal-educated persons). They engage people in 
symbolic discourses of belonging, in- and exclusion, and feelings of inferiority 
or superiority as to cultural and religious traditions, and the formal political 
arena allows them to pursue their interests forcefully subverting the national 
as a whole.” (Abbink 2006:403) 
In this quote Abbink describes how a new generation of formally educated ethnic 
elites are able to shape discourse and influence how ethnic groups perceive and 
navigate between each other. Their ‘access to knowledge’ (Ribot and Peluso 2003) 
provides them the ability to figure out how to make ‘legitimate’ claim-making in a 
political order of ethnic federalism, and furthermore the ability to shape discourse, 
rearticulating ethnic identities and reviving and reconstructing historic animosities in 
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accordance with their economic, political, social and ideological interest (Debelo 
2012).  
7.3.1. The power to shape discourse: strategies of retelling, reviving and 
renaming 
In many cases from the Ethiopian lowlands, it is evident that ethnic elites have the 
power to legitimate dispossession of opponent groups by establishing a primodialist 
discourse of the opponent ethnic group as backward savages that cannot be trusted as 
stewards of a federal region. This type of constructed images and stereotypes are i.e. 
evident in the conflict between Guji and Burji (Debelo 2012): “Members of both 
groups define themselves as ‘different from them’ as a result of the reactivation of 
differences by local ethnic actors and cadres.” (Debelo 2012:529). Ethnic 
entrepreneurs on both sides polarize markers of distinctiveness and activates past 
memories with the motive of constructing a ‘self’ and the ‘other’ that matches the 
present interest. Burji portray Guji as a warlike and inherently cruel group, while Guji 
portray the former as a feminine, weak and incompetent group in warfare. The use of 
stereotypes has significant impact on mutual respect, trust and interaction between the 
groups and feed into existing and potential inter-group conflicts (Debelo 2012). 
Ethnic entrepreneurs hold the ability to formulate history, producing a discourse of 
who are ‘indigenous’ or ‘truthful’ inhabitants of a given area and specific resources. 
The shifting nature of state support through the imperial time, the Derg regime and 
EPRDF government, causes that most ethnic groups are able to narrate about a 
‘golden age’ where specific pastoral resources were granted ‘their property’. Ethnic 
entrepreneurs in this sense make selective appropriation in constructing narratives, 
process events, institutions and people, connect them to present and render them 
meaningful in the context of their specific interest (Debelo 2012).  
Hagmann and Mulugeta (2008) describe renaming of strategic rangelands as yet 
another innovative strategy of ethnic claim-making taking place in the pastoral 
lowlands of Ethiopia: 
“Changing the names of areas where strategic rangelands, water wells and 
settlements were concentrated in order to legitimize their incorporation into 
one's home territory became another strategy of ethnic claims-making” 
(Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008: 30). 
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The rationality behind this technique is the common perception that the ethno-
linguistic group, naming the specific natural resource, must be the ‘indigenous’ and 
legitimate owner. Once again this is a manipulative technique carried out by ethnic 
elites, who through their possession of powers have a rich repertoire of dominance. 
Strategies such as rearticulating ethnic identities, reviving and reconstructing history, 
and changing names of rangelands and water points are all acts of domination, and so 
are the acts of counter-domination from the opponent ethnic group. 
7.3.2. Alliance-making and lucrative relationships to government authority 
In numerous cases a good relationship with other ethnic groups and to government 
authority is shown to be a strong means to gain, maintain and control valuable and 
conflicted resources. Previously, in chapter 6, we learned that the governments’ 
selective approach to finding ‘legitimate’ customary institutions underlines the 
importance of access to government authority. In the case between Borana and 
Somali group, Tache and Oba (2009) pinpoint an improved relationship to the state as 
the catalyst for recent success of the Somali group in reclaiming territories:  
“(…) it appears that they have been more proactive in reclaiming territories 
they allege belonged to them by taking advantage of the improved political 
relationship with the state” (Tache and Oba 2009:421). 
Borana and the Ethiopian state had before 1991 had a strategic alliance against ‘the 
common enemy’ – the expansive Somali groups. However, in the new ethnic federal 
system, the common enemy became representatives of regional states and gradually 
improved their relationship to the Ethiopian central state. For the Borana ethnic 
group, mutual strategic alliances were replaced by suspicion and discordance, which 
simultaneously cause an opportunity for the Somali group to expand their position 
(Tache and Oba 2009). Generally, historic oppression of the remote lowlands, 
unfulfilled promises and shifting state support have materialized as mistrust towards 
the state apparatus on all administrative levels. 
Alliance-making with other ethnic groups is another tool of strategic positioning in 
contemporary conflicts. In Mieso District, three Oromo clans (Ittu, Nole and Ala) 
have formed an alliance to counter the Somali Issa, who is demographically larger 
and markedly better armed (Beyene 2009). Historic animosities between the three 
Oromo groups have been forgiven and forgotten in order to unite against the common 
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and powerful opponent. This case highlights that ethnic entrepreneurs do not revive 
all historic animosities, but that they rather shape historic relationships and events 
according to their motives and aspirations. In this case, currently, collaboration was 
deemed the most beneficial opportunity in the three clans’ navigation in the moving 
environment. As the environment moves, new motives and aspirations emerge in the 
minds of the ethnic entrepreneurs. Opportunities for new alliances appear, and if 
ethnic entrepreneurs perceive these more beneficial, they redefine elements of old 
relationships and ‘switch’ (Elwert 2002) alliance to gain a more powerful position 
(Debelo 2012). Social and political relationships and loyalty are hence redefined in 
line with shifting interest of ethnic elites, which is a manifestation of situational 
construction of identity. 
7.3.3. Marginalization as a strategy 
While some powerful actors seek to build closer ties to the Ethiopian state, others 
defend their position on ‘the margins’. In the article ‘Rather marginalized than 
incorporated’ Devereux (2010) depicts how elites from the Somali pastoralist 
communities in Somali Region resist incorporation into the federal state, defending 
their hitherto autonomous and marginalized status. They are ethnic entrepreneurs, 
currently benefitting from being excluded from the federal state, not having to pay 
taxes and import duties, thus carrying out resistance to the expansion of the Ethiopian 
state. The Somali clans are also well armed, providing them with a superior position 
in many contemporary conflicts. They see state interventions as ‘adverse 
incorporation’ rather than inclusion. It is however important to note, that 
marginalization only bring certain benefits to the few in Somali society, while it 
heightens the vulnerability of all Somalis, because the state refuse to provide support 
in both ‘normal’ times and during crises. The basic social services in the Somali 
Region is appalling, since the government rejects to deliver public services in such a 
dangerous and unstable environment (Devereux 2010). This entails that the most 
marginalized people in the most marginalized regions of Ethiopia are further 
marginalized and excluded (ibid). 
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8. DISCUSSION 
8.1. Main Conclusions 
The results presented above suggest that the introduction of the post-1991 political 
order of ethnic federalism has been a key factor in the increasingly more frequent 
violent inter-ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia’s pastoral lowlands. The state thereby fails in 
bringing the intended peace to the numerous conflicts between the country’s diverse 
ethnic groups. Evidence from empirical cases indicate that ethnic federalism is 
actually transforming pastoral conflicts, extending competition over access to include 
an array of social, political and economic resources, stretching beyond the 
traditionally important pastoral resources of pastures and wells. Conflicts have thus 
transformed from pre-1991 struggles over natural resources to competition over new 
sources of revenue. This brings into question, whether the term ‘pastoral conflict’ has 
become increasingly inappropriate in grasping the logic of contemporary conflicts in 
the lowlands of Ethiopia. The new linkage between ethnic territorial control and 
political power has, together with sedentary policies and state-led development 
programs, effectively transformed how pastoral groups relate to their natural 
environment and each other. They have become more ‘emplaced’ in the sense that 
their lifestyles undergo a transformation from being flexible and mobile towards 
becoming more permanent and sedentarized. In this process previous sharing 
arrangements between ethnic groups erode, as land and ethnic boundaries hardens. In 
sum, it becomes clear that the decentralization has effectively transformed how 
pastoralists relate to their territory and related resources, reconfiguring the 
relationship between competing groups. 
Our findings further show that the state takes an ambiguous role in the context of the 
implementation of ethnic federalism. We observe that the central state retains the 
power to take important political and economic decisions at the centre, while rejecting 
responsibility for conflictual outcomes of the policy, rendering these regional and 
local matters. Critical voices thus view the ethnic federal system as a scheme working 
to avoid joint political alliances against the state, as the system inevitably creates 
inter-community disharmony, blocking the grounds for forming political alliances 
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against the state. The policy of ethnic conflict has furthermore been referred to as a 
‘containment policy’, serving to control potential opposition. The decentralisation 
policy has effectively distanced pastoral conflicts from the sphere of the central state, 
by decentralising issues to lower levels of administration. However, simultaneously 
the country’s peripheral areas have been increasingly incorporated into the state’s 
political and economic systems. This emphasises the need for understanding 
contemporary conflicts in the context of on-going state-expansion from the central 
highlands to the remoter lowlands. Regional states are officially conferred with 
powers to enact regional land laws within the frame of state ownership of land, but a 
lack of capacity and real autonomy amputate nearly all attempts to formulate any. 
This fact has rendered legal land tenure rules undefined. Concurrently, customary 
authorities are undermined and ‘retraditionalized’, paradoxically due to their legal 
recognition in the Ethiopian 1995 constitution. The observed legal recognition is 
selective in nature, as administrators of the local governments determine which 
customary custodians that are ‘indigenous’ and ‘legitimate’. The local government 
personnel backing the customary actors do not hold legitimate authority, and are 
furthermore accused for having other political agendas than just supporting the 
decision-making. The prospects of power and economic gains resulting from the role 
as legal conflict mediator, escalate competition and drives actors to apply social, 
financial and discursive powers to gain such a position. This commercial 
‘marketization’ of peace-making has thus resulted in widespread scepticism towards 
customary actors among their own communities, thereby limiting their ability to make 
and enforce peace agreement previously agreed upon. This fact is supported by 
findings from empirical research, showing that pastoralist and agro pastoralists no 
longer obey customary rules and regulation. This is especially evident in the Issa-Ittu 
conflict, where increasingly frequent violent clashes are observed. This stands in 
contrast to the past, where the parties often were able to find compromises through 
peaceful mediations.  
As regional land laws are non-existing in most lowland regions, and as customary 
mediation mechanisms to a large extent have lost their legitimacy, no socially 
accepted mechanisms are in place to govern pastoral resource access. Access to the 
pastoral resources in the peripheral lowlands is hence left more or less open, with no 
enforceable rules available for the exclusion of others. The outcome is that violent 
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confrontations become the most dominant approach for pastoral and agro-pastoral 
groups to gain, maintain and control access to pastoral resources. Furthermore, access 
to weapons and the formation of alliances with other clan militias, become powerful 
repertoires of domination in contemporary struggles over pastoral resources and other 
social, political and economic resources. 
It is evident in every case study included in this paper that the situation of open access 
and the politicization of ethnicity, following the ethnic federal system, have opened a 
window of opportunity for what we refer to as ethnic entrepreneurs. Ethnic 
entrepreneurs are pastoral elites partly fostered by the growing profitability for policy-
makers in the EPRDF government to generate a loyal pastoral elite. Decentralisation 
is, as Poteete and Ribot puts it, a process in which some actors gain power, while 
others risk losing powers. A lot is at stake in the positioning of ethnic groups in the 
new political order, and these entrepreneurs take the lead in this scramble. Looking 
into the case studies, we find that ethnic entrepreneurs apply a range of strategic acts 
of domination to get advantages at the expense of others. Ethnic federalism’s 
politicization of ethnicity has redefined conflict along ethnic identity lines rather than 
simple resource needs. Thereby the policy encourages individual claims to be made 
under collective guise, as ethnic affiliation with a group thus provides the individual 
with the needed legitimacy. The choice of strategy constantly changes as the unstable 
and unpredictable social and political environment moves. The ethnic entrepreneurs 
navigate according to immediate personal interest, continuously trying to consolidate 
or expand their position of power. Entrepreneurs from the various ethnic groups 
possess bundles of powers, which they use to act and counter-act against each other in 
the strife for ethnic positioning and resource claims. Strategies evident in the 
empirical cases include; ethnic elites who (re)articulate ethnic identities, revive or 
(re)construct historic animosities and specific events in accordance with economic, 
political, social and ideological interest. Also, renaming of strategic rangelands and 
wells to conceal illegitimate incorporation into own territory and establishing a 
lucrative relationship to the central, regional and district governments are recurrent 
strategies identified in the case studies. Similarly, the strategy of promoting ethnic 
differences, and shaping a primordial and stereotypic discourse of the opponent ethnic 
group, thereby lowering the opponent’s chance of gaining a position of power, are 
observed. Furthermore, a popular strategy is to form alliances with other clans or 
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ethnic groups and switching these alliances continuously, following immediate 
interest to gain a more powerful position. Lastly, demographically large and well-
armed groups follow a strategy of making their territory appear unstable and insecure 
to remain autonomous and outside government control. All these strategies determine 
the positioning of the various ethnic groups in the Ethiopian lowlands in the scramble 
for power and pastoral resources in the new political order of ethnic federalism. 
8.2. Implications of our approach 
This paper has adopted an approach emphasizing socio-political elements of pastoral 
conflicts. This is not done to disregard the importance of ecological factors and 
resource scarcity. However, what is revealed is that even though the Ethiopian 
lowlands seems to offer all the ingredients normally used by scholars in the 
environmental security tradition to explain the occurrence of conflict and violence, 
the fact is that conflicts are the results of much broader and complex processes. The 
Ethiopian lowlands are indeed characterized by environmental degradation, 
population growth, climate change, political instability and increased scarcity (Haile 
2004). Nonetheless, our approach uncovers that what could be interpreted as simple 
struggles over pastures and water wells, are in fact equally about new sources of 
revenue. Furthermore, despite being fought in areas under limited government 
control, the state is actively mediating resource governance, peace-making 
mechanism and group identities (Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008). What we do is to put 
emphasis on the new political order created after the installment of ethnic federalism, 
as it has significant implications for local realities in the Ethiopian case. The 
argument is however not there is no link between resource scarcity and the occurrence 
of violence. The problem is rather that pre-adopted attention to the causality between 
scarcity and violence blurs the understanding of the occurrence of violence (Bogale 
and Korf 2007), ignoring the complexities of potential resource conflicts. Rather, our 
argument is that we have to broaden the scope of analysis to catch the complex causes 
behind inter-group violence. Hence, to gain a holistic approach in unfolding pastoral 
resource conflicts in full, scarcity issues need to supplement the social and political 
factors of conflict generation, and may thus also be seen as a limitation of this study. 
However, the aim of this study has not been to unfold contemporary conflicts in total, 
but rather to underline the need to situate conflicts in historical and ongoing processes 
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of state expansion. Notably, we have to be careful not to interpret pastoral conflicts as 
a depoliticized issue.  
8.3. Broadening the scope to a wider African context 
Broadening the scope to look at other African countries reveals that similar 
conclusions on the complexities of pastoral conflicts can be drawn. Pastoralist areas 
have through time been defined by drought, famine, violent conflict, and related 
humanitarian crises. Natural and human factors have been factors combining in a 
deadly mix, not just in Ethiopia, but also in e.g. the pastoral Darfur in Sudan, on the 
Uganda Kenya-border and in Somalia (Catley, Lind and Scoones 2013). Pastoralists, 
since colonization, have found themselves at the margins, both physically at the edge 
of the new states, and within the political system – deprived their property rights due 
to their nature of cross-border mobility (Ibid.). In Kenya, the poorest regions of the 
country are pastoral. The pastoral regions, such as the Pokot and Turkana, experience 
significant political marginalization, leading to a lack in the provision of basic 
services such as education, health care and related infrastructure (Shilling et al. 2012). 
The case shares many similarities to the one of neighboring Ethiopia. The Kenyan 
government attempts to demarcate the political administrative boundaries, between 
the Pokot and the Turkana are considered important factors in contributing to conflict 
between the two groups. The role of boundary making, and issues of state-formation, 
in spurring conflict, are thus not unique to the Ethiopian case.   
In a study of herder-farmer conflicts in the arid regions of the Sahel in West Africa, 
Turner (2004) finds that conflicts are spurred from deeper tensions between local 
communities. His arguments is, similar to ours, that conflicts in dryland Africa may at 
first glance match the view of “small wars,” but are in fact conflicts waged over long 
time periods, involving histories being raised and withdrawn, to match the claims 
expressed in the present. He observes how a small piece of pasture, which initially 
seemed insignificant, is fought over, not for the grazing resources it contains, but over 
the fact that control over this piece of land includes the ability to gain greater tax 
revenue from outsider herders (Turner 2004). Turner thus concludes that: 
“The case of farmer–herder conflict in the Sahel provides ample opportunity 
to consider the often overlooked complexity of resource-related conflicts. 
Despite the poverty of the region, resource-related conflicts are not simply 
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struggles over resources but reflect a broader set of tensions within 
agropastoral societies, many of which have moral dimensions and which 
cannot be seen as simply derivative of in-the-moment struggles to subsist. In 
fact, these conflicts may result from manipulation for political gain or in fact 
be orchestrated actions for higher political purposes.” (Turner 2004:885). 
Turner makes many of the same observations as this paper, including the importance 
of new sources of revenue, and the strategic positioning by local elites. It thus seems 
to remain clear that the environmental security paradigm is flawed and unable to 
explain the occurrence of violence between groups. The Ethiopian case is albeit 
unique to some extend. Ethiopia is until today probably the only country in the world, 
which has constitutionally granted all ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ the universal 
right to govern themselves (Aalen and Hatlebakk 2008). This consequently creates 
altered state-group and group-group relationships, which are not seen in other 
contexts. For this reason, there seems to be even more valid grounds for advocating a 
political ecology approach to understanding contemporary inter-ethnic pastoral 
conflicts in Ethiopia’s lowland periphery.  
8.4. Discussing the implications of ethnic federalism 
The policy of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is currently unique to the African 
continent, but a similar political order has been implemented in India, and is currently 
in the process of being implemented in Nepal. In the following we discuss if our 
findings are unique to the Ethiopian case, by making a comparison of the two existing 
federal ethnic-based systems, in Ethiopia and India respectively. The intentions 
behind the installment of the new political order have been similar in all of the three 
country cases; the attempt to accommodate multiple ethnic groups by dividing 
sovereignty and authority between the central government and lower levels of 
administration, in order to prevent violent conflict, instability and state disintegration 
(Aalen and Hatlebakk 2008). The reasoning behind this thinking is that the source of 
inter-ethnic struggles will be effectively undermined, when ethnic groups form the 
majority in sub-units of self-determination, and are able to promote own culture and 
identity. The extents, to which these goals have been achieved, differ from the two 
existing cases. A study conducted by Aalen and Hatlebakk (2008) finds that the 
Indian and Ethiopian federal states both to some degree struggle with instability, in 
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terms of localized ethnic conflict and secessionist movements, but that the Indian 
federal system proves far more successful. The reasons behind the divergence of 
performance are to be found in the institutional arrangements and the context, in 
which the ethnic federal system is implemented (ibid). Aalen and Hatlebakk (2008) 
point to three main reasons for the Indian success. Firstly, Indians have maintained an 
overarching national identity in addition to the ethnic one. The existence of a dual 
loyalty is essential to the unity of the state. Secondly, India’s huge diversity, with 
crosscutting cleavages within and between subunits and ethnic groups, prevents 
cultural and social divisions from cumulating and hardening. Thirdly, the strength of 
India’s parliamentary democracy plays a crucial factor for the success of the federal 
system. In relation to this factor, Aalen and Hatlebakk (2008) writes:  
“Regular elections and the spread of democratic ideas has led to increased 
political activism among the wider population, including marginalized groups 
(Dalits, other low castes, and Muslims), but has also enhanced the legitimacy 
of the central government and made it possible to justify a strong centre, 
securing the unity and efficiency of the federation.” (Aalen and Hatlebakk 
2008:5) 
The three aspects that Aalen and Hatlebakk (2008) find to be determining factors for a 
successful performance of ethnic federalism, sheds light on the short-comings of the 
Ethiopian political system. The Ethiopian federation does in many ways represent the 
contrary. In terms of national identity, our study shows that ethnic identities are 
superior to an overall Ethiopian identity both in the political and the civil sphere. In 
terms of social cleavages, our findings indicate that ethnic divisions seem to absorb 
most controversies along other sub-group lines. Other social and economic cleavages 
are hereby ‘etnicized’, so they appear as ethnic. The last and maybe most important 
reason, for why India has been more successful than Ethiopia in implementing an 
ethnic federal state, is Ethiopia’s weak democratic foundation and the de facto 
institutional arrangement of the federal system. Our findings suggest that the central 
apparatus intervene in local and regional affairs, thereby undermining regional power 
and causing conflict. The ethnic groups in the federal divisions are not given a real 
chance of influence, and generally the central state lacks legitimacy. All these issues 
represent why the federal system of Ethiopia has failed to create a successful and 
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sustainable accommodation of ethnic diversity, and therefore still struggles to prevent 
violent conflict, instability and state disintegration.  
The discussion above points to the fact that ethnic federalism is not an evil per se and 
thus not the cause of inter-ethnic conflict. Rather, if it is not cautiously managed, it is 
as Debelo (2012) says ‘a potent force to be used by ethnic actors for different 
purposes’ (Debelo 2012:531). There seems to be no clear answer to whether ethnic 
federalism promotes or undermines democracy and stability in multi-ethnic states. 
Evidence from the Indian experience suggests that the illegitimate centralization of 
power and the lack of democracy in Ethiopia are undermining the federal division of 
power. Furthermore, the federal subdivision following ethnic lines seems to 
exacerbate ethnic conflict in the Ethiopian case, as the political system permits only 
expressions of ethnic cleavages. These findings indicate that democracy must 
supplement federalism for it to have a stabilizing and reconciliation effect. In Ethiopia 
it is evident that local ethnic conflicts are rampant, especially in ethnically mixed 
areas. Our findings suggest that the federal government has failed to solve the 
structural problems of ethnic conflicts, treating only the symptoms. We suggest the 
need to assert that all citizens within the various federal regions hold political power, 
not just the indigenous, ethnic ones. This would lower the urge and incentive for 
ethnic entrepreneurship. We do, however, also suggest, on a more general level, that 
federal units follow alternative territorial lines rather than ethnic ones, as ethnic-
linguistic homogeneity is impossible to achieve in any territory in multi-ethnic states 
such as Ethiopia.  
	   49	  
 
9. Conclusion 
The aim of this study has been to demonstrate how the post-1991 political order of 
ethnic federalism has affected local-level, inter-ethnic conflicts in the peripheral 
lowlands of Ethiopia. A comprehensive review of a large body of theoretical literature 
and a variety of case studies has enabled us to make such an analysis. Through a 
political ecology approach and the adoption of a conceptual framework emphasizing 
the importance of power relations and agency among actors, the paper unfolds how 
contemporary conflicts have been reconfigured by the state. The study demonstrates 
the changed dynamics of pastoral conflicts through the use of various key notions, 
such as social navigation, ethnic entrepreneurs and repertories of domination. 
The main findings of this study suggest that ethnic federalism did not have the 
intended effects, as it has been a key factor in increasing the frequency of violent 
inter-ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia’s pastoral lowlands. Evidence from empirical cases 
indicates that ethnic federalism has transformed how pastoralists relate to territory, 
related resources and other (agro-)pastoral groups. Contemporary pastoral conflicts 
include competition over access to an array of social, political and economic 
resources, stretching beyond the traditionally important pastoral resources of pastures 
and wells. This brings into question, whether the term ‘pastoral conflict’ has become 
inappropriate in grasping the logic of contemporary conflicts in the lowlands of 
Ethiopia. 
We argue that the policy of ethnic federalism is part of state expansion, constructed to 
ensure incorporation, control, and containment of pastoral communities in marginal 
regions. The political order is marked by an overruling and illegitimate central 
government. A state-led co-optation and constitutional recognition of customary 
institutions has, intentionally or not, undermined their legitimacy and resulted in 
widespread scepticism towards customary actors among their own communities. The 
resulting outcome is a de facto open access regime, as no socially accepted means of 
governing and excluding others from pastoral resources prevail. We encounter that in 
this scenario, violent confrontations have become the predominant approach to gain, 
maintain and control pastoral territories and related resources. Moreover, we find that 
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the open access regime and the politicization of ethnicity combined have opened a 
window of opportunity for ethnic entrepreneurship. Ethnic elites strategically use and 
rearticulate ethnicity in their personal pursuit of power and scarce resources, making 
individual claims under collective guise. Our findings imply that ethnic 
entrepreneurship hardens ethnic boundaries and increase tensions between ethnic 
groups, as ethnic entrepreneurs seek to expand their position of power and get 
advantages at the expense of others. 
Through this study we seek to promote the need to view contemporary resource 
conflicts as complex and multidimensional phenomenon. The lowlands of Ethiopia 
encompass all the ingredients, which environmental security scholars deem as causal 
causes of violent conflicts, but our study advocates for digging deeper and paying 
attention to complex power dynamics and the role of the state. In the Ethiopian and 
other African cases no evidence points to the existence of immediate, ‘here and now’ 
conflicts, rather revealing pastoral resource conflicts as deep-rooted historical, social 
and political disputes. It is crucial to note that many of the tendencies identified in this 
study are detected in other places in Africa, but that the formal ‘ethnitizing’ of politics 
render Ethiopia a unique case. Ultimately, this study materializes as a critique towards 
the policy of ethnic federalism. We argue that this ethnically based system only 
legitimizes claims and expressions with reference to ethnicity, thereby redefining 
conflict along ethnic identity lines rather than simple resource needs. The illegitimate 
centralization of power and the lack of democracy in Ethiopia are undermining the 
federal division of power, which essentially reverse the prospect of stability and 
reconciliation between Ethiopia’s various ethnic groups. 
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